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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

AID-05 COME-00 EB-07 FRB-03 TRSE-00 XMB-02 OPIC-03

CIEP-01 LAB-04 SIL-01 OMB-01 MC-02 ACDA-05 STR-04

IO-11 IGA-02 /108 W

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R 130835Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5585

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1514

FROM AMBASSADOR BYROADE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, PK, US, IR

SUBJ: IRANIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN

REF: ISLAMABAD 1270

1. ACCOMPANIED BY TEHRAN AND ISLAMABAD EMBOFFS, AND CALLED ON VICE MINISTER OF WAR GENERAL TOUFANIAN MORNING FEBRUARY 12. NOTED THAT BEFORE I LEFT ISLAMABAD, GOP OFFICIALS HAD GIVEN ME THEIR VIEW OF GOP/GOI MILITARY RELATIONSHIP AND THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO SHARE THOSE THOUGHTS WITH TOUFANIAN. EMBPHASIZED THAT I WAS NOT IN TEHRAN TO PLEAD PAKISTAN'S CASE, BUT DID THINK PAKISTAN HAD VERY LEGIMATE NEEDS IN DEFENSE SECURITY FIELD.

2. AFTER BRIEF REVIEW OF EVENTS LEADING TO LIFTING OF U.S. ARMS EMBARGO, I DESCRIBED GOP COORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN DETERMINING ITS DEFENSE NEEDS AND HOW THEY COULD BEST BE MET. THE TECHNICAL TEAM VISIT TO THE STATES AND RECENT
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ORGANIZATION CHANGES IN GOP MILITARY, HOWEVER, HAD HELPED EASE

THOSE DIFFICULTIES. TOUFANIAN AGREED THAT AT FIRST GOP DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE CLEAR IDEA OF ITS MILITARY PRIORITIES. HE CITED INCLUSION OF HIGH COST ROLAND MISSILE IN FIRST GOP MILITARY ITEMS LIST AS EXAMPLE OF PAKISTAN'S NOT UNDERSTANDING DOLLAR REALITIES OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND NOT BEING AWARE IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROCEED STEP BY STEP IN OBTAINING EQUIPMENT. I SAID OUR AGREEMENT TO SELL TOW TO PAKISTAN WAS CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF BOTH NEW MILITARY SALES RELATIONSHIP WE ARE ESTABLISHING AND GOP'S GROWING APPRECIATION OF ITS OWN NEED TO ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OF CONSTRAINTS.

3. I ADDED THAT NOW THAT MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES ARE ON THE TRACK, MAIN OUTSTANDING QUESTION FACING GOP WAS FINANCING PURCHASES. TOUFANIAN SAID GOI HAD SUGGESTED PAKISTAN BUY THE TOW AND WAS GLAD TO SEE THEY HAD DONE SO. HE ADDED TOW PURCHASE WAS ONE REASON FOR DOLS150 MILLION LOAN GOI HAD JUST GIVEN PAKISTAN. I NOTED SOME CONFUSION SEEMED TO EXIST ABOUT THE DOLS150 MILLION. I UNDERSTOOD FROM THE PAKISTANIS, BEFORE LEAVING ISLAMABAD, THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A MISUNDERSTANDING OVER WHETHER THE DOLS150 MILLION WAS A NEW LOAN FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT OR PART OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT PACKAGE THE SHAH HAD PROMISED BHUTTO DURING THEIR MEETING AT KISH LAST YEAR. TOUFANIAN REPLIED THAT THE SHAH HAD DIRECTED HIM TO MAKE THE DOLS150 MILLION LOAN TO PAKISTAN OUT OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND HE HAD TRANSFERRED FUNDS TO FINANCE MINISTRY FOR THAT PURPOSE. HE THEREFORE THOUGHT THAT SUM WAS SEPARATE FROM LARGER BUDGET SUPPORT PACKAGE. HE ADDED THAT PERHAPS THE MISUNDERSTANDING AROSE BECAUSE THE SHAH HAD ORIGINALLY TOLD THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE TO TRANSFER THE MONEY FROM ITS RESOURCES, AND LATER TOLD TOUFANIAN IT SHOULD COME FROM THE DEFENSE BUDGET. IN ANY CASE, IN HIS VIEW, DOLS150 MILLION WAS A NEW LOAN AND FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT. TOUFANIAN ALSO SAID THE NEW DOLS150 MILLION WAS IN ADDITION TO THE DOLS150 MILLION THE SHAH EARLIER TOLD HIM TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO PAY FOR THE PAKISTANI TANK RETROFIT PROGRAM UNDERWAY IN IRAN.

4. TOUFANIAN NOTED THE GOI WAS NOT RECONSIDERING ITS AID PROGRAM FOR PAKISTAN IN SPITE OF IRAN'S CURRENT BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS. AS SHAH HAD TOLD THE AMBASSADOR, GOI IS REEVALUATING LOANS TO THE U.K. AND FRANCE, BUT SAHA HAD NOT DIRECTED

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ANY ACTION WITH RESPECT TO ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN. IRAN IS WELL AWARE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE AREA AND ITS AIMS IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE GULF. THE GOI WANTS TO HELP PAKISTAN GAIN STRENGTH AGAINST THAT THREAT. TOUFANIAN ADDED THE GOI IS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN BALUCHISTAN REMAIN STABILIZED.

5. TOUFANIAN ADDED THE SHAH WAS ALSO GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT

POOR STATE OF PAKISTAN AIR FORCE. IT WAS OUT-MODED AND COULD NO LONGER PLAY A CREDIBLE DEFENSE ROLE. THE GOI KNEW PAKISTAN WAS INTERESTED IN THE A17 AND HOPED USG WOULD BE ABLE TO HELP. I TOLD THE GENERAL WE HAD JUST INFORMED GOP THEY COULD SEND A TEAM TO THE STATES TO SEE THE A-7, AND WE HAD ALSO AGREED THAT A-7 MANUFACTURER COULD SUPPLY UNCLASSIFIED TECHNICAL DATA ON THE PLANE TO GOP. WE HAVE NOT AGREED TO SELL THE AIRCRAFT, BUT PAF WILL NOW HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE IT FIRST-HAND, COMPARE IT WITH OTHER AIRCRAFT IT MAY BE STUDYING, AND DECIDE WHETHER IT WILL WANT TO ASK US FOR PERMISSION TO PURCHASE. TOUFANIAN WELCOMED THIS NEWS AND REITERATED THE SHAH'S PERSONAL CONCERN OVER NEED TO UPGRADE THE PAF, AS WELL AS HIS BELIEF THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD GO FOR OUR A-7 AIRCRAFT.

6. AT CLOSE OF MEETING, TOUFANIAN MENTIONED HE WAS ON HIS WAY FOR AUDIENCE WITH THE SHAH, WOULD REPORT THE CONVERSATION, AND CONVEY MY REGARDS.

7. THAT EVENING, AT A DINNER GIVEN BY THE AMBASSADOR, TOUFANIAN TOLD ME THAT HE HAD REPORTED OUR CONVERSATION FULLY TO THE SHAH. THE SHAH HAD CONFIRMED TOUFANIAN'S IMPRESSION THAT THE DOLS150 MILLION IN QUESTION WAS NEW RPT NEW MONEY NOT CONNECTED WITH PREVIOUS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS COMMITMENT. I EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION, SAYING THIS WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED BY BHUTTO AND PAKISTAN OFFICIALDOM. THAT BEING SO, I SUGGESTED, IN VIEW OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF IRANIAN-PAK RELATIONS, THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST IF TOUFANIAN SAW TO IT THAT THE MATTER WAS CLARIFIED DIRECTLY WITH PAKISTAN AND NOT THROUGH ME. TOUFANIAN SAID HE APPRECIATED THE THOUGHT AND THEREUPON BRIEFED PAK AMBASSADOR KHATTAK, ALSO PRESENT AT THE DINNER. KHATTAK TOLD ME LATER HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MESSAGE AND WOULD RELAY IT PROMPTLY TO BHUTTO.

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